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2000] DEVELOPMENTS- THE PATHS OF CIVIL LITIGATION 
VI. ADR, THE JUDICIARY, AND JUSTICE: 
COMING TO TERMS WITH THE ALTERNATIVES 
Any discussion of recent developments in civil litigation must ad-
dress the virtual revolution that has taken place regarding alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR). Attorneys have witnessed a steady growth 
in their clients' recourse to ADR in place of lawsuits, and ADR is in-
creasingly incorporated into the litigation process itself - in the form 
of court-annexed arbitration, mediation, summary jury trials, early 
neutral evaluation, and judicial settlement conferences. "Alternative" 
models of dispute resolution have inarguably penetrated the main-
stream;1 the relevant question now is how they will change it. 
The judicial embrace of ADR presents opportunities and concerns 
that distinguish court-annexed programs from the broader trend of 
contractual ADR. Its versatile mechanisms have much to offer over-
loaded courts, but as ADR gains ground in the judiciary, it becomes 
urgent to isolate better the values of each from the other. Policymak-
ers must carefully design judicial ADR programs to preserve the access 
to public adjudication that has rendered the judiciary so invaluable an 
institution, and they must incorporate into judicial ADR the proce-
dural norms necessary to satisfy fundamental fairness without sacri-
ficing the flexibility that gives ADR its force. 2 
This Part explores developments in ADR generally, with prescrip-
tive attention to the unfolding progress of the judicial use of ADR. 
Section A reviews the history of the modern ADR movement, section 
B surveys significant developments in statutory and case law, and sec-
tion C outlines the need for further procedural elaboration in court-
annexed ADR. 
1 Although still nominally "alternative," the negotiation-based tools of ADR represent the 
norm of legal practice. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We 
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious So-
ciety, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 26-36 (1983). 
2 See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services by 
Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 715 (1999). 
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A. The ADR Revolution: Origins, Champions, and Critics 
The oft-cited statistic that fewer than ten percent of all cases filed 
result in a judicially adjudicated decision3 reflects the salience of set-
tlement negotiation as the primary vehicle of private dispute resolu-
tion.4 More formal mechanisms of private dispute resolution are also 
longstanding; arbitration5 in commercial settings and mediation by 
community leaders have provided effective means of conflict manage-
ment for centuries.6 During the first half of the twentieth century, 
large-scale collective bargaining disputes encouraged the development 
of professional mediation, and some courts began experimenting with 
mediation in the 1950s to resolve minor criminal and family disputes.' 
In the 1960s, local communities established neighborhood justice cen-
ters to provide facilitative dispute resolution services for neighbors, 
families, tenants, and consumers.8 
I. The Birth of the Modern ADR Movement.- In the 1970s, ju-
rists began to voice concerns about the rising costs and increasing de-
lays associated with litigation, and some envisioned cheaper, faster, less 
formal, and more effective dispute resolution in such alternatives as 
3 See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regula-
tion of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994). 
4 "Positional" negotiation, a fundamental aspect of litigation practice throughout history, in-
volves bargaining between high and low aspiration points until the difference is split to both par-
ties' satisfaction. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: 
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 3-4 (2d ed. 1991). The ADR movement has 
fostered the development of more sophisticated techniques of "principled" negotiation, see gener-
ally id., and "problem-solving" negotiation, see generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. 
PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN 
DEALS AND DISPUTES (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript oil file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary), which seek to generate fair, optimal alternatives. 
S In arbitration, a "third-party neutral" adjudicates a case based on an abbreviated factfinding 
process with relaxed evidentiary rules. Disputants choose arbitration because decisions may be 
kept private, closure is emphasized, disputes proceed more rapidly toward resolution than in litiga-
tion, and at least in contractual contexts, parties may exert some control over the choice of arbitra-
tor. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER & NANCY H. ROGERS, DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 234 (3d ed. 1999). 
6 See id. at 6-7. 
7 See id. at 7. Mediation involves a third-party neutral to facilitate problem-solving communi-
cation and option-generation. Strategies employed by mediators range from interest-based facilita-
tive mediation, in which the mediator approaches the process from a non-judgmental stance, to 
rights-based or evaluative mediation, in which the mediator expresses opinions regarding the 
strengths and weaknesses of each position based on legally cognizable rights. See generally Leon-
ard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the 
Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7 (1996) (analyzing different styles of mediation). 
8 See Daniel McGillis, Minor Dispute Processing: A Review of Recent Developments, in 
ROMAN TOMASIC & MALCOLM FEELEY, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERG-
ING IDEA 6o, 64 (1982); see also Jill Richey Rayburn, Neighborhood Justice Centers: Community 
Use of ADR - Does It Really Work?, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. II97, 1222-28 (1996) (noting that 
neighborhood justice centers create community cohesion but may vary in quality). 
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arbitration and mediation.9 As the use of ADR mechanisms grew, 
proponents viewed them as promising vehicles for an array of agendas. 
Jurists hoped ADR would relieve docket congestion, while litigators-
especially repeat players in the insurance and securities industries -
were attracted to its promise of cheaper, faster resolution of claims that 
raised no new issues of law. 1° Community development advocates 
hoped ADR would provide broader access to dispute resolution for 
those unable to afford traditional litigation. 11 In the 198os, social sci-
entists, game theorists, and other scholars showed how ADR mecha-
nisms could facilitate settlement by dealing proactively .with heuristic 
biases through the strategic imposition of a neutral third partyY 
Meanwhile, process-oriented ADR advocates emphasized that prob-
lem-solving approaches would yield remedies better tailored to parties' 
unique needs and that the more direct involvement of disputants 
would encourage greater compliance with outcomes and help rebuild 
ruptured relationships.13 Some supporters lauded ADR for its poten-
tial to restore a culture of civility to the legal system.14 
9 Professor Frank Sander first articulated ADR as a field of legal inquiry in 1976 at the Pound 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, at which 
he proposed his vision of a "multidoor courthouse" offering a variety of dispute processing vehicles. 
See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PER-
SPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). 
10 See GOLDBERG, SANDER & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 8. 
11 See, e.g., William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 384, 384-87 (1985). On the far left, SUJ?pOrt for ADR emerged on the theory that it 
represented indigenous recapture of power over people's disputes from courts and lawyers. See id. 
For a critique of this theory, see Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hier-
archy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 1, 3 (1993), who argues that "harmony ideology" was a response to the law reform discourse 
of the 1960s and that ADR placates its participants without vindicating their legal rights. 
12 Disputants' perceptions of incoming settlement offers are often distorted because they engage 
in "reactive devaluation," discounting accurate information offered directly by the other party and 
making irrational decisions regarding risk. Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and 
Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26, 38-42 (Kenneth Arrow, Robert 
H. Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky & Robert Wilson eds., 1999) (proposing that ADR-
conversant lawyers can offset these distortions). 
13 See generally, Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A 
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994). Advocates 
found that ADR's means for identifying Pareto-optimal alternatives improved outcomes for all by 
directing the resolution process away from the zero-sum model. See, e.g., FISHER, URY & PATTON, 
supra note 4, at 56-80 (encouraging exploitation of differences in time horizons or risk preferences). 
14 See, e.g., Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of 
Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST.]. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 
833-39 (1998) (arguing that increased use of mediation may elevate legal practice); see also Frances 
McGovern, Beyond Efficiency: A Bevy of ADR Justifications (An Unfootnoted Summary), DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 12, 13; cf GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC 
CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS I-IO (1965) (arguing that 
cultural factors shape political institutions). 
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As ADR gained prominence in judicial, academic, and private cir-
cles, it also attracted the attention of critics. In the first serious attack 
on ADR, Professor Owen Fiss exhorted the legal community not to 
subordinate what he considered the primary function of the judiciary 
- the articulation of public values through the application of legal 
principles - to its ancillary role of resolving private disputes. 15 Sub-
sequent critical scholarship has continued to press the concern that 
ADR falls too far on the private law side of the public/private quan-
dary, threatening rights-based jurisprudence and the rule of law,16 
public accountability,17 and even the judiciary itself. 18 Some proce-
duralist critics fear that ADR's negotiation-based approach may dis-
empower vulnerable parties with limited bargaining strength, particu-
larly civil rights and family law disputants.19 
Furthermore, critics argue that ADR fails to address real problems 
of the legal system. Skeptics challenge the notion that ADR is more 
efficient than litigation, questioning whether it really saves time or 
money20 and disputing the asserted judicial overload itself.21 Others 
worry that ADR creates ethical problems for practitioners.22 At least 
one scholar suggests that many benefits of ADR have already been 
IS See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073. 1085-87 (1984). 
16 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 668, 671 (1986) ("[W]e must. determine whether ADR will result in an abandonment 
of our constitutional system in which the 'rule of law' is created and principally enforced by le-
gitimate branches of government.''· 
17 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Mester, The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of r996: Will the 
New Era of ADR in Federal Administrative Agencies Occur at the Expense of Public Accountabil-
ity?, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 167, 185-96 (1997) (arguing that the exemption of federal 
arbitration from the Freedom of Information Act undermines public accountability). 
!8 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and 
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 2II, 262-63 (1995) (suggesting that ADR is weak-
ening the judiciary); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice 
Through ADR, II OHIO ST.]. DISP. RESOL. 241, 261-62 (1996) (warning of judicial "white flight," 
whereby the rich opt for private ADR and leave an underfunded judiciary for the poor). 
!9 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Chris· Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert, Fair-
ness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 
WIS. L. REV. 1359, 140o--o4 (addressing class bias in the administration of ADR); Trina Grillo, The 
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549-50 (1991) (examin-
ing results of ADR in child custody disputes); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The 
Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 61 (1984) 
(articulating a feminist critique of domestic violence mediation). 
20 See, e.g., Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 
IOWA L. REV 889, 915 (1991); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming 
the Meaning of Article III, I 13 HARV. L. REv. 924, 1001 (2000) (discussing the RAND Institute for 
Civil Justice's findings that many judicial settlement efforts are "resource-consumptive'} 
21 See, e.g., Weinstein, s11pra note 18, at 265-67. 
22 See, e.g., Carrie Menkei-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No 
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 407, 421 
(1997) (discussing the failure of legal ethics to address the complex relationships managed in ADR). 
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diminished over the course of its institutionalization, which has gradu-
ally rendered ADR more like the system it sought to transform.23 
2. ADR at the Turn of the Century.- Even as jurists debated the 
merits of the budding ADR movement, contractual arbitration and, 
later, mediation developed as preferred methods of dispute resolution 
in major areas of law practice, especially commercial24 and employ-
ment law,25 in as well as the administration of mass insurance claims26 
and class action torts. 27 ADR mechanisms nurtured in the neighbor-
hood justice centers of the 1960s emerged by the late 1990s as the dar-
lings of the business world for their cost efficiency and facilitation of 
continuing business relationships. In a 1997 Price Waterhouse survey 
of the "Fortune IOoo" companies, nearly all of the 530 respondents had 
used some form of ADR, and ninety percent classified ADR as a "criti-
cal cost control technique."28 Private ADR vendors and law firms' 
ADR practice groups began to market their services more widely.29 
Today, contractual ADR use continues to expand in the construe-
23 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innova-
tion Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," I9 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. I, 3 (I99I). But see Jack M. Sabatino, 
ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. I289, I292 (I998) (arguing in favor of ADR's incorporation of 
many legal evidentiary and procedural norms). 
24 See, e.g., GABRIEL M. WILNER, I DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3 (I999). 
25 See Christine Lepera & Jeannie Costello, New Areas in ADR, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: WHAT THE BUSINESS LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW 593, 6IO (PLI Litig. & Admin. 
Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-605, I999). Employers are attracted to ADR for its facili-
tation of preventive management. See, e.g., John E. Sands & Sam Margulies, ADR in Employment 
Law: The Concept of Zero Litigation, N.J. LAW., Aug.-Sept. I993, at 23, 23-24 (discussing the fit 
between "new" management structures and ADR in addressing employment-related conflicts). 
26 For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) administered a claims resolution 
program at the request of the Florida Department of Insurance following the devastation of south-
em Florida by Hurricane Andrew in I992. See Cindy Fa.zzi, Disaster: When It Strikes, ADR Can 
Come to the Rescue in Resolving Mass-Tort Claims, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb. I998, at I6, I6-I7. 
27 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Resolving Mass-Tort Claims: The Perspective of a Special Master, 
DISP. RESOL. J., Feb. I998, at IO, Io-I2 (describing the role of ADR in the Agent Orange, DES, 
and Dalkon Shield class actions). But cf Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 52 I U.S. 59I, 628 (I997) 
(rejecting a mass tort settlement plan for its failure to account for the interests of future claimants). 
28 Sabatino, supra note 23, at I30I. For a detailed report on corporate use of ADR, see David 
B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Patterns of ADR Use in Corporate Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb. 
I999, at 66, 66-71. Approximately 4000 companies have subscribed to the Center for Public Re-
sources (CPR) Institute for Dispute Resolution's Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to 
Litigation, which obligates them to explore the use of ADR in disputes with other signatories. See 
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, CPR Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litiga-
tion (visited Apr. 2, 2000) <http://www.cpradr.org/corppol.htm>. 
29 The top three private providers of ADR are the American Arbitration Association (AAA), 
J*A*M*S*, and the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution. See Sabatino, supra note 23, at I30I. 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113: I 7 52 
tion,30 health care,31 entertainment,32 telecommunications,33 intellec-
tual property,34 and technology industries.35 ADR is proving signifi-
cant in the resolution of environmental and other public policy dis-
putes,36 and mediation techniques are increasingly used in community 
fora addressing juvenile justice and violence in schools.37 ADR is also 
apt for disputes involving online commerce between geographically 
disparate parties,38 and a rapidly developing area of ADR is on the 
Internet itself, where an array of dispute resolution services are avail-
able online.39 Finally, increased international exchange has led to the 
30 See, e.g., Richard H. Steen & Robert]. MacPherson, The Construction Industry: Forging a 
Path for ADR, N.J. LAW., Aug.-Sept. I993 1 at I9, 19-20. 
31 In 1997, the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, and the AAA 
formulated due process standards and procedures for health care disputes. See Roderick B. Mat-
thews, Rx for Managed Care, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1999, at 14, I4. In 1998, the resulting 
Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution recommended the use of ADR to resolve conflicts 
involving patients, doctors, health care providers, and managed care programs. See William K. 
Slate, ADR and the Health Care Challenge, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1999, at I, I. 
32 The Practising Law Institute highlighted entertainment law as one of the fastest-growing 
areas of ADR practice, reporting that the AAA experienced a 25% growth in entertainment cases 
in 1997 alone. See Lepera & Costello, supra note 25, at 607. 
33 See, e.g., Lori Tripoli, Telecommunications Act Offers Opportunity for ADR Advocates, 
INSIDE LITIG., Mar. 1997, at 3, 3 (reporting that the CPR Institute's Telecommunications Group is 
recommending ADR to state agencies that must implement the Thlecommunications Act of I 996). 
34 The American Intellectual Property Law Association and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization both endorse ADR. See Nancy Neal Yeend & Cathy E. Rincon, ADR and Intellec-
tual Property: A Prudent Option, 36 IDEA 601, 602 (1996). 
35 See, e.g., William F. Baron, High-Tech/High Resolution: ADR in Technology Disputes, DISP. 
RESOL. J., Apr. I996, at 88, 90 (noting characteristics of ADR amenable to technology disputes). 
36 See, e.g., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACH-
ING AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan, Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, The Consen-
sus Building Institute eds., 1999) (discussing public policy disputes); Charlene Stukenborg, The 
Proper Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Environmental Conflicts, 19 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 1305, 1309-25 (1994) (surveying the history of ADR in modern environmental disputes). 
37 See, e.g., T. Nikki Eckland, The Safe Schools Act: Legal and ADR Responses to Violence in 
Schools, 31 URB. LAW. 309,321-22 (1999). 
38 See, e.g., E. Casey Lide, ADR and Cyberspace: The Role of Alternatit•e Dispute Resolution in 
Online Commerce, Intellectual Property and Defamation, 12 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 193, 
216-22 (1996). The availability of reliable dispute resolution can help Internet commerce reach its 
full market potential. For example, Square Trade's Transecure service uses online ADR to resolve 
disputes involving long-distance electronic commerce. See Square Trade, About Us (visited Apr. 2, 
2000) <http://transecure.com/aboutus/aboutus_alloff.cfm>. 
39 See, e.g., Martin C. Karamon, ADR on the Internet, II OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 537, 
537 (1996). For example, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
has accredited ADR providers to arbitrate disputes online about Internet domain names. See 
Ethan Katsh, The New Frontier: Online ADR Becoming a Global Priority, DISP. RESOL. MAG., 
Winter 2000, at 6, 8. Online ADR providers also handle general disputes. For example, CyberSet-
tle offers a simple technological means of defeating the "reactive devaluation" barrier to settlement, 
see supra note 12, by asking both parties to submit the zone of settlement values to which they 
would be willing to agree and then informing parties whether they have a shared Zone of Possible 
Agreement. See CyberSettle, CyberSettle.com (visited Apr. 2, 2ooo) <http://www.cybersettle.com/ 
flash.htm>; see also Katsh, supra note 38, at 7. 
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widespread adoption of ADR in international arenas40 that lack a uni-
form set of legal and cultural expectations regarding the management 
of disputes.41 Meanwhile, ADR mechanisms continue to evolve.42 
J. ADR and the Courts.- The practice of ADR has coalesced into 
two realms: the private (or "contractual") sphere, in which parties 
agree to submit disputes to nonjudicial fora of resolution, and the judi-
cial (or "court-annexed") sphere, in which litigants engage in ADR 
through the court system, sometimes at their option and sometimes as 
mandated by statute or local rule.43 Private ADR receives only limited 
judicial review, as courts presume that participation in arbitration is 
consensual and as mediated settlements are consensual by definition. 
In contrast, the results of court-annexed arbitration are rarely bind-
ing,44 and though good-faith participation in court-annexed mediation 
may be compelled, parties are not required to reach agreement.45 
(a) Mediation. -According to a 1996 study of the federal courts 
by the Federal Judicial Center and the Center for Public Resources, 
mediation is the most prevalent form of court-annexed ADR.46 In 
1996, over half of all federal district courts provided mediation serv-
ices, generally in-house or in cooperation with an external ADR pro-
vider.47 Although outcomes in court-annexed mediation remain con-
sensual, courts often compel participation by certain claimants.48 
Court-annexed mediation is common in family law cases,49 and many 
40 See, e.g., First Global Research Facility Dedicated to ADR Launched, DISP. RESOL.]., Aug. 
1999, at 4, 4; Betty Southard Murphy, ADR's Impact on International Commerce, DISP. RESOL.]., 
Dec. 1993, at 68, 69. Because some foreign courts refuse to hear technology and Internet cases, 
ADR is the only recourse in these situations. See Lepera & Costello, supra note 25, at 6oo. 
41 Researchers report widespread dissatisfaction among Mexican and Canadian disputants, 
with more than so sets of laws that must be managed in U.S. litigation, and indicate that the avail-
ability of ADR has significantly improved the international free trade climate. Mediation is also 
more compatible with cultural biases in Canada and Mexico against litigation. See L. Richard 
Freese, Jr. & Robert Sagnola, New Challenges in International Commercial Disputes: ADR Under 
NAFTA, COLO. LAW., Sept. 1997, at 6r, 62. 
42 See GOLDBERG, SANDER& ROGERS, supra note 5, at 275-77. 
43 See, e.g., GOLDBERG, SANDER & ROGERS, supra note s, at 372. These realms differ only 
loosely because court-annexed ADR is provided as often by private practitioners on a courthouse 
roster as it is by court personnel or volunteers. See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIEN-
STRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES & 
LAWYERS 9-IO (1996). 
44 The Seventh Amendment renders all arbitration nonbinding in federal court; most states 
provide a similar constitutional guarantee for jury trials in civil disputes. See ge11erally Dwight 
Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. 
REv. 487, 493-95 (1989) (outlining the constitutional constraints on ADR). 
45 See GOLDBERG, SANDER & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 372. 
46 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 43, at 4-5. 
47 See id. aq. 
48 See GOLDBERG, SANDER & ROGERS, supra noll~ 51 at 372. 
49 See, e.g., Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: 1Wo-
Headed Monster or 1Wo Sides of the Same Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. r, r 1 & n.68. 
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Farm Belt states mandate mediation of agricultural debt foreclosures. 50 
Other programs address disputes ranging from the siting of radioactive 
waste to the interpretation of Do-Not-Resuscitate orders. 51 
(b) Arbitration. - As of 1999, statute or local rule provided for 
court-annexed arbitration in thirty-three states and twenty-two federal 
district courts.52 Federal courts generally do not compel participation 
in court-annexed arbitration,53 but the same is not true of state 
courts.54 Although judicial arbitration is rarely binding, courts may 
impose disincentives for rejecting the arbitrator's decision - for ex-
ample, requiring that respondents who achieve results in subsequent 
trials as or less favorable to the arbitration award pay fines or fees.55 
(c) Other forms of ADR. - Mediation and arbitration remain the 
most widespread forms of ADR, but practitioners continue to develop 
additional problem-solving means of resolving disputes. Summary 
jury trial, a mock trial settlement device, involves the truncated pres-
entation of evidence and argument before a judge and a jury, which 
renders a nonbinding decision; afterward, the parties engage in better-
informed settlement negotiations.56 Similarly, in early neutral evalua-
tion, a knowledgeable third-party neutral meets with the parties before 
litigation begins and evaluates their positions on the merits, facilitating 
more realistic settlement negotiation. Courts are also experimenting 
with the use of minitrials57 and special settlement masters.58 Finally, 
so Examples include Montana, Nebraska, and Utah; participation is generally at the option of 
the debtor fanner. See generally Leonard L. Riskin, 'IWo Concepts of Mediation in the FmHA's 
Farmer-Lender Mediation Program, 45 ADMIN. L. REv. 21 (1993). 
St See Sabatino, supra note 23, at IJOD--01 & nn.J7-57· 
52 See GOLDBERG, SANDER & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 373· 
53 The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 199S requires that court-annexed arbitration be 
voluntary, with the exception of 10 districts authorized by the Judicial Improvements and Access 
to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 901(a), 101 Stat. 4642, 4662 (19SS), to establish experimental 
compulsory arbitration programs. See 2S U.S.C. § 654 (Supp. IV 199S). 
54 Various states have enacted compulsory nonbinding arbitration for specific types of disputes. 
For a sampling, see Sabatino, supra note 23, at 1300 & nn.J7-57· 
55 See Nancy F. Reynolds, Why We Should Abolish Penalty Provisions for Compulsory Non-
binding Alternative Dispute Resolution, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. I 73, IS2 (1991). However, 
the legal authority for these penalties has been questioned. See id. (arguing that courts lack consti-
tutional authority to apply such penalties); Tiede! v. Northwestern Mich. College, S65 F.2d SS, 93-
94 (6th Cir. 19SS) (overturning penalty provisions on statutory but not constitutional grounds). 
56 In theory, summary trial jurors should not know that their verdict is not binding, a charac-
teristic that has elicited criticism. Chief Judge Posner fears it compromises the seriousness with 
which jurors take cases, as the presence of summary jury trials means they never know whether a 
given trial is "real." See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury 'JHal and Other Methods of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 336, 3S6-87 (r9S6). 
57 In the minitrial, attorneys for the parties give abbreviated presentations to an adjudicative 
panel consisting of a neutral authority and a representative with settlement authority for each 
party. See Robert G. Fryling & Edward J. Hoffman, Step by Step: How the U.S. Government 
Adopted the ADR Idea, DISP. RESOL. J., May 199S, at So, So. Based on the presentations, the 
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judicially mandated settlement conferences, in which judges attempt to 
mediate settlement negotiations during the pre-trial phase, are now 
routine in many courts.59 
B. Developments in Statutory and Case Law 
Over the past few decades, ADR has emerged from a shadowy "al-
ternative" status into common legal parlance. The legislative and ex-
ecutive branches both require federal agencies to look first to ADR in 
seeking resolutions of disputes,60 and Congress has declared that all 
federal district courts must enact ADR programs to help streamline 
their dockets.61 The judiciary has been slower in its embrace,62 but 
even the Supreme Court has wielded an activist gavel in favor of ex-
panding ADR use.63 Nonetheless, the case law reveals doctrinal and 
ethical issues that have yet to be resolved in the new marriage between 
private and public forms of dispute resolution. 
I. Statutory Developments.- Overturning the traditional common 
law doctrine declining enforcement of arbitration agreements, 64 Con-
gress first declared a national policy favoring arbitration in 1925 with 
party representatives attempt to negotiate a settlement, but if they fail, the neutral adjudicator 
provides a nonbinding assessment of the merits in the case, predicting the outcome at trial. See id. 
58 In particularly complex cases, courts appoint special masters, chosen for their expertise in the 
relevant subject matter, to hear the parties' arguments and prepare recommendations to the court. 
See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Creative Use of ADR: The Court-Appointed Special Settlement Master, 
59 ALB. L. REV. 881, 884 (1996) (describing the use of spedal masters in asbestos, defective heart 
valve, and Dalkon Shield class action suits). Used in the past on a more limited basis, special mas-
ters increasingly assist courts by conducting direct settlement negotiations. See id. 
59 Judicially mandated settlement conferences require parties to balance their management of 
settlement concerns against their management of relations with a judge who may ultimately wield 
total power over the disposition of their case. For this reason, some commentators argue that 
judges should not mediate cases assigned to them for trial. See, e.g., James Alfini, Risk of Coercion 
Too Great, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at II, II. Taking Alfini's argument one step further, 
Frank Sander argues that judging and mediation should remain mutually exclusive. See Frank 
E.A Sander, A Friendly Amendment, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at II, 11. 
60 The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736, 
required each federal agency to adopt a policy for using ADR. See id. § J. The White House 
pressed has the issue further: expanding on a Bush Administration executive order requiring gov-
ernment attorneys to seek settlement to manage caseloads more efficiently, see Exec. Order No. 
12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991), President Clinton mandated consideration of ADR as a means 
of reaching efficient resolution of all civil claims in which the government is a party, ue Exec. Or-
der No. 12,988,61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (1996). 
61 See 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (Supp. IV 1998). 
62 See irifra p. 1862. 
63 See cases cited infra notes 9CHJ2, 94, 96. 
64 Under the English common law "ouster doctrine," courts voided arbitration agreements be-
cause such agreements ousted courts of their jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the laws of the 
sovereign. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 977 (2ooo). 
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passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),65 which rendered con-
tracts to arbitrate binding and provided federal recognition of arbitra-
tion awards.66 In 1990, Congress passed the Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act,67 which authorized federal agencies to use a full range 
of ADR mechanisms and required them to explore how use of ADR 
could advance their missions.68 In 1996, Congress significantly ex-
tended the scope of the Act69 by authorizing true binding arbitration 
for federal agencies/0 simplifying the procedural requirements for ne-
gotiated rulemaking,71 and enhancing confidentiality protections.72 
At the same time, the judiciary fostered the paradigm shift toward 
pre-trial settlement through Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which facilitated settlements by granting trial courts discretion 
to convene pre-trial settlement conferences.73 Amendments to Rule 16 
in 1983 required judges to address the possibility of using extrajudicial 
procedures to resolve disputes/4 and further amendments in 1993 
specified these procedures as ADR. 75 The promotion of settlement by 
the evolving Federal Rules has, as powerfully as any legislative action, 
laid the foundation for our modern culture of settlement. 76 
65 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-16 (1994). But see Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate 1bol?: Debunking the Supreme 
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 641 (1996) (refuting the claim 
that the FAA actually established such a "policy" favoring arbitration). 
66 See 9 U.S. C. §§ 2, 9-II (1994). 
67 Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584 (1994 & Supp. III 
1997)). 
68 See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1994). 
69 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, rro Stat. 3870. 
70 See 5 U.S.C. § 575(c) (1994 & Supp. lli 1997). The 1990 Act gave agencies authority to em-
ploy private arbitrators, see id. § 573(a), but constitutional concerns raised by the Justice Depart-
ment led to a provision enabling agency directors to vacate an award within 30 days for any rea-
son, see id. § 58o(b}-(c); Charles Pou, Jr., Reauthorized Laws Show Government's ADR Comfort 
Level Is Increasing, reprinted in WHAT THE BUSINESS LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ADR 
app. at 635 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-578, 1998). Under the 
1996 Act, agencies are bound on equivalent terms as private parties, but to assuage remaining con-
cerns about possible abuse of public funds, the Act requires federal agencies entering into arbitra-
tion to specify a maximum arbitral award. See 5 U.S.C. § 575(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
7! See 5 U.S.C. § 569 (1994 & Supp. lli 1997). 
72 See 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Of all statutory issues affecting agency ADR use 
under the 1990 Act, the troubling disconnect between it.~ confidentiality provisions and the Free-
dom of Information Act caused the most concern. See Pou, supra note 70, app. at 635; Jeffrey M. 
Senger, Thrning the Ship of State, J. DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 23-24, on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library) (addressing confidentiality concerns). The 1996 Act pre-
vents disclosure of most documents in a neutral's possession and communications between a party 
and the neutral. See 5 U.S.C. § 574(j) (1994 & Supp. lli 1997). 
73 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
74 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1983). 
75 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(9) advisory committee's note (1993). Professor Resnik identifies this 
as the moment when" ADR ... moved inside the courts." Resnik, supra note 18, at 230. 
76 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1339. 
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·The 1990 passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA),77 which 
authorized the federal judiciary to implement pilot court-annexed 
ADR programs, closed the divide between legislative and judicial pos-
tures toward ADR. In 1993 and 1994, based on the success of such 
programs, legislators proposed mandating the provision of court-
annexed arbitration in federal district courts, but the judiciary insisted 
that such provision be optional. 78 The compromise plan continued 
authorization of the twenty districts with existing ADR programs -
ten of which could provide only voluntary, nonbinding arbitration and 
ten of which could, at their option, require participation in arbitration 
programs. 79 
The most important statutory development to date, the Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) of 1998,80 mandates that every federal 
district court implement an ADR program because ADR "has the po-
tential to provide a variety of benefits, including greater satisfaction of 
the parties, innovative methods of resolving disputes, and greater effi-
ciency in achieving settlements."81 The Act requires federal civil liti-
gants to consider ADR at appropriate stages in litigation and instructs 
each district court to offer at least one ADR alternative.82 Signifi-
cantly, the Act authorizes courts to compel participation in mediation 
or early neutral evaluation processes but requires consent for court-
annexed arbitration.83 Although the judicialization of ADR may itself 
raise threshold questions, the most troubling aspect of the statute is the 
lack of procedural guidelines provided for courts required to imple-
ment ADR programs. The ADRA directs each court to establish its 
own rules concerning confidentiality and disqualification of neutrals.84 
The discretion afforded individual courts to determine the nature and 
extent of annexed ADR programs may encourage helpful evolution of 
ADR, but it may also lead to undesirable variety in procedure and 
77 Pub. L. No. IOI-650, I04 Stat. 5089 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C). 
78 See Resnik, supra note IS, at 237-38. 
79 See id. A report by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice evaluated six programs and con-
cluded that, although participants were generally supportive, the programs did not significantly 
relieve docket congestion. See JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, 
DANIEL MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE, & MARY E. VAIANA, RAND INST. 
FOR CIV. JUST., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 48-53 (I996). However, the report's methodology has been rig-
orously challenged. See, e.g., William H. Erickson, The RAND Report: Concerns and Future 
Choices, COLO. LAW., Oct. I997, at 7· 
80 Pub. L. No. I05-3I5, I 12 Stat. 2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 65 I-658 (Supp. IV I998)). 
81 /d. § 2. 
82 See 28 U.S. C.§ 652(a) (Supp. IV I998). 
83 See id. The Act directs each court to examine any existing ADR programs for compliance 
with the law, but the IO district courts that established mandatory arbitration programs under the 
CJRA are exempted from compliance with the consent-rule for new arbitration programs. See id. 
§ 654(d); Eileen Barkas Hoffman, The Impact of the ADR Act of 1998, TRIAL, June I999, at 30, 31. 
84 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 652(d), 653(b) (Supp. IV I998). 
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practice. Furthermore, the Act appropriates no funding to implement 
programs, rendering impotent hopes of significant innovations in 
courts already struggling to cover basic expenses.85 More congres-
sional support is needed before courts can properly implement and 
evaluate the ADRA. 
2. Case Law Developments: Arbitration. - Although case law 
poorly tracks the progress of ADR, it does reveal the evolution of posi-
tive judicial regard for arbitration, as well as the increasing levels of 
power that the judiciary is willing to cede to private dispute resolution. 
In 1953, the Supreme Court expressed its hostility toward ADR-
despite Congress;s passage of the FAA- in Wilko v. Swan,86 uphold-
ing a client's right to litigate a securities claim against his brokerage 
firm even though he had contracted with the firm to arbitrate all such 
disputes.87 Fearing that arbitration would prove less loyal to the law 
and less protective of vulnerable parties than courtroom adjudication, 
the Court held that parties were unable to consent to waive litigation 
of their federal rights.88 The Wilko regime persisted until 1983, when 
the Court held that the FAA established that doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.89 
The Court overruled Wilko in a progression of cases between 1985 and 
1991,90 culminating with Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 91 in 
which the Court explicitly dismissed its previous concern in Wilko re-
garding unequal bargaining power between parties contracting to 
waive rights to litigate federal statutory claims.92 
By welcoming arbitration of even federal statutory claims, the Su-
preme Court formalized a shift away from its role in the articulation of 
public legal standards. With courts regarded less as vehicles for 
"regulation and rights pronouncement"93 and more as fora for the dis-
position of individual conflicts, the arbitration tribunal seemed ever 
more like a court - and less subject to concerns of lawlessness. 
85 Lack of funding renders impossible even the most basic statutory obligation to provide "ade-
quate training" for staff. See John Bickerman, Great Potential: The New Federal Law Provides 
Vehicle, If Local Courts Want to Move on ADR, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 3, 4· 
86 346 u.s. 427 (1953). 
87 See id. at 428-30, 438. 
88 See id. at 434-38. 
89 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. r, 24 (1983). 
90 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (overruling 
Wilko and enforcing an ex ante arbitration agreement under the Securities Act of 1933); Shear-
son/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (finding that courts' duty under FAA 
to enforce arbitration contracts is not diminished when claims raise statutory rights); Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (allowing arbitration of 
antitrust claims arising out of domestic or international agreements). 
9! 500 u.s. 20 (1991). 
92 See id. at 33. 
93 Resnik, supra note 18, at 226. 
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Sharing this view, the current Court has departed notably from its re-
cent trend of federalist reasoning to draw state jurisprudence in line 
with federal precedent, holding preempted by the FAA all state stat-
utes denying recognition to arbitration agreements or otherwise 
thwarting federal policies favoring arbitration.94 Still, the Supreme 
Court appears to have reserved certain issues to the judiciary, includ-
ing the question of arbitrability itself.95 On the whole,.however, the 
Court has granted increasing levels of authority to ADR neutrals, in-
cluding the power to award punitive damages.96 Some courts have 
even allowed arbitrators to adjudicate class actions.97 
Nevertheless, tension between the desire for maximum efficiency 
and anxiety over issues of fairness continues to stymie courts in their 
efforts to interpret the Supreme Court's determination that parties 
who contract to arbitrate "will be held to their bargain."98 Gilmer ex-
plicitly discounted power imbalance as a per se reason to invalidate 
arbitration clauses,99 but lower courts continue to exhibit concern over· 
inequalities in bargaining power between parties to adhesion con-
tracts.100 For example, endorsing consideration of actual assent in 
94 In AUied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995), the Court rejected the 
Supreme Court of Alabama's ruling that the FAA applied only to contracts that contemplate a 
substantial "interstate commerce connection" and struck down a Jaw denying enforcement to ex 
ante arbitration agreements. ld. at 281-82. For the Court's first holding that the FAA applies to 
state, as well as federal, courts, see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
95 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-44 (1995) (holding that courts 
may review arbitrators' decisions on arbitrability de novo unless "clear and unmistakable" evi-
dence shows that the parties agreed to arbitrate questions of arbitrability). But see Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-o4 (1967) (holding that federal courts are 
barred from hearing consent-based challenges to broad arbitration agreements if the challenge goes 
to the substance of the entire contract); 2 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. 
STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER 
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 15.3 (1999) (discussing Prima Paint).· In addition, the First, 
Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have authorized courts to issue preliminary 
injunctions in disputes subject to mandatory arbitration. See Catherine Cronin-Harris, A Primer 
on ADR Statutes and Cases, in WHAT THE BUSINESS LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ADR, 
supra note 70, at 449, 469. Other issues preserved for the courts include questions of fraudulently 
induced or unconscionable contracts and determinations of statutes of limitations. See id. 
96 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 6o-62, 64 (1995) (upholding 
the inclusion of punitive damages in an arbitration award). 
97 See, e.g., Blue Cross v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 794 (Ct. App. 1998) (allowing 
classwide arbitration when authorized by state Jaw). But see Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 
269, 276 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that, unless an arbitration agreement specifically provides for class 
action treatment, a court cannot certify class arbitration). 
98 Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); see also Gilmer v. Inter-
state/]ohnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
99 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33· 
100 See, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating 
an arbitration clause in light of congressional concerns regarding unequal bargaining power); Stir-
len v. Supercuts, Inc., 6o Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 158-59 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding an arbitration agree-
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agreements to arbitrate,101 the California Supreme Court recently de-
nied review of an appellate court's refusal to enforce a bank's unilat-
eral imposition of a mandatory binding-arbitration clause on its 
checking and credit card account holders. 102 The lower court had re-
fused to enforce the arbitration clause because the bank had quietly 
grafted it onto an initial contract that had not considered dispute 
resolution at all. 103 The degree to which individuals can waive their 
rights to litigate federal claims also continues to attract scrutiny.104 
Moreover, although the judiciary has seen fit to cede disposition of 
claims to ADR fora, it has not done so without concern for the preser-
vation of procedural due process for individual disputants. In Cole v. 
Burns International Security Seruices, 105 a landmark case straining 
the holding in Gilmer, the D.C. Circuit found that an employer who 
compels arbitration of claims as a condition of employment cannot 
burden an employee who brings a claim with the costs of arbitra-
tion.106 In addition to requiring employers to bear these costs, 107 Chief 
Judge Edwards further advocated judicial imposition of minimum 
procedural standards when employers require arbitration of statutory 
ment to be an unconscionable contract of adhesion because the defendant employer presented it as 
a standard employment contract after the commencement of employment). 
101 See, e.g., Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., I44 F.3d IIS2, II90 (9th Cir. I99S) (holding 
that employees cannot be compelled to waive the right to bring claims under Title VII as a condi-
tion of their employment); Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, II3 F.3d uo4, II05--<>S (9th 
Cir. I 997) (holding that an arbitration clause contained in the Uniform Application for Securities 
Industry Registration did not constitute a knowing waiver of Title VII and related state claims); 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d I299, I305 (9th Cir. I994)i see also Richard Reuben, 
The Pendulum Swings Again: Badie, Wright Decisions Underscore Importance of Actual Assent to 
Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall I999, at IS, IS (arguing that the "relinquishment of legal 
rights through mandatory arbitration contract provisions must be knowing and voluntary'?. 
102 See Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 29I (Ct. App. I99S). 
103 See id. at 2S7-8S. The court found the provision unconscionable but noted that an adhesion 
contract is not per se unconscionable if it prescribes fair procedures. See id. at 2 7 7 n.5. 
104 In Wright v. Universal Maritime Services Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (I998), a unanimous Court 
agreed that a waiver of federal rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act implied by an ar-
bitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement must be "clear and unmistakable." /d. at 
So. The waiver analysis allowed the Wright Court to evade the pressing issue whether Gilmer's 
denial of de novo review of statutory claims had overturned the seminal holding in Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 4I5 U.S. 36 (I974), that union representatives may not waive workers' rights 
to litigate statutory claims as part of a collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 5 I. Indeed, this 
question has "badly fractured the lower court[s]," Reuben, supra note IOI, at 22 n.2, especially with 
respect to the adjudication of civil rights claims. Compare Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 958 
F.2d I3391 I347 (6th Cir. I992) (holding that section I9S3 rights can be asserted regardless of con-
tracts to arbitrate), with Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 97I F.2d 698, 700--<>I (11th Cir. I99~) 
(holding that Title VII claims can be subject to compulsory arbitration). 
!OS I05 F.3d I465 (D.C. Cir. I997). 
106 See id. at I482. 
107 Payment of neutrals in court-annexed ADR remains a difficult question. Of the 4I courts 
offering mediation services in I996, only nine provided the service without charge. See 
PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 43, at Io-I I. 
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claims as a condition of employment.108 Specifically, he recommended 
a neutral arbitrator conversant with relevant law, fair access to infor-
mation necessary for presenting a claim, the right to independent rep-
resentation, remedies equal to those available in litigation, a written 
opinion explaining the decision, and sufficient judicial review to ensure 
compliance with governing statutory rights. 109 
The Cole court sought to broaden the grounds for judicial review of 
arbitral awards under the "manifest disregard" doctrine, a standard 
raised in Wilko v. Swan110 and later rea:ffirmed by the Supreme 
Court,111 which allows for judicial review of an arbitral decision made 
in "manifest disregard" of the law. 112 Insisting that courts ensure 
meaningful review of public law issues in private fora of dispute reso-
lution, the Cole court urged that arbitral awards be set aside not only 
if they fail to adhere to the law, 113 but also if they violate basic norms 
of procedural fairness.U 4 Following Cole's lead, the Second Circuit set 
aside an arbitral award for its "manifest disregard of the evidence"115 
-a dramatic departure from the dominant regime of arbitral review, 
exerted narrowly and only on questions of law.116 
108 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482. 
!09 See id. Similarly concerned about the lack of procedural due process protection in arbitra-
tion, the ABA and several ADR organizations have promulgated a Due Process Protocol for media-
tion and arbitration of statutory disputes arising out of the employment relationship, proposing 
standards for choice of representation, fee payment, and access to information, as well as guide-
lines for neutral selection, training, conflicts of interest, and scope of authority. See Task Force on 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, Document: A Due Process Protocol for Mediation 
and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, DISP. RESOL. 
J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37, 37-39. The President's Commission on the Future of Worker-Manage-
ment Relations, chaired by Harvard economist and former Labor Secretary John T. Dunlop, has 
also called for "quality standards" in contractual non-union ADR that are the functional equivalent 
of due process standards. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30, 25-33 (1994). 
110 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (noting that parties are bound by arbitral decisions not in "manifest 
disregard" of the law). 
111 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (citing Wilko). 
112 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436; see also Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for 
Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731, 739, 81o-19 (1996) (describing the 
doctrine but noting the rarity with which courts use it to overturn arbitration awards). 
113 See, e.g., Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (uth Cir. 1997) (overturn-
ing an arbitration award which evidenced manifest disregard for the Fair Labor Standards Act 
and holding that arbitrators are bound to apply the law absent a valid agreement not to do so). 
114 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482. 
115 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998). But see DiRussa v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 820 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming an arbitral award in the absence 
of "manifest disregard for [clear and applicable] law'} 
116 See, e.g., Halligan, 148 F.Jd at 204. However, courts have been receptive to a trend toward 
parties' contracting for increased judicial review. See, e.g., Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 
130 F.3d 884, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1997). But see Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, 
Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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Also relying on Cole, the Eleventh Circuit recently upheld a trial. 
court's refusal to enforce a contract to arbitrate in the absence of 
guarantees that the "high costs" of arbitration would not obstruct the 
plaintiff's ability to vindicate statutory rights. 117 The Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari118 and may soon begin to clarify the scope of 
procedural rights implicated by arbitration. 
J. Case Law Developments: Mediation and Other Forms of ADR. 
- Whereas arbitration cases test the limits of the judiciary's willing-
ness to allow arbitrators to assume court-like powers, mediation cases 
test the parameters of judicial tolerance for dispute resolution methods 
that depart more dramatically from the adjudicatory model. Courts 
have struggled to determine the appropriate procedural treatment of 
evidence as it circulates through and between ADR and litigation pro-
cesses, particularly in the context of court-annexed ADR, in which due 
process concerns are heightened. Some courts have accorded eviden-
tiary privileges to mediators, while others have subordinated confiden-
tiality concerns to the proverbial "search for truth." Conflict of inter-
est questions also divide the courts. In resolving these questions, 
courts confront fundamental tensions between fairness and efficiency. 
Although rules of evidence and procedure offer guidance regarding 
the confidentiality of settlement negotiations,119 mediation presents a 
situation unanticipated by rules established in contemplation of litiga-
tion and settlement negotiations: facilitation by a third-party neutral. 
Settled authority is lacking regarding the parameters of privilege in the 
neutral relationship and participants' reasonable expectations of confi-
dentiality. Several states have created a mediation privilege120 to pro-
tect disclosures made during mediation, 121 but some courts, including 
the Fifth Circuit, have subordinated interests in mediation confidenti-
ality to the power of courts to procure evidence in criminal proceed-
117 Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., I78 F.3d II49o IIS8 (uth Cir. I999). 
118 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, No. 99-I235, 2000 WL r22 rso (U.S. Apr. 3, 
2000). 
119 Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence (and corresponding state rules) generally protect evidence obtained during negotiations from 
admission in court, and some courts have also protected such evidence from discovery under Rule 
26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
120 Related to the issue of mediation privilege is the granting of immunity to neutrals in non-
binding ADR programs. See Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d I249, I2SO (D.C. Cir. I994) (granting im-
munity to a court-appointed mediator sued for an alleged breach of his confidentiality obligation). 
12 1 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT.§ 2S-29I4 (I99S)i see also, e.g., Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pen-
sion & Health Plans, r6 F. Supp. 2d II64, u8o (C.D. Cal. I998) (holding that communications 
made during the course of a formal mediation were protected by a federal mediation privilege pur-
suant to Rule sor of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
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ings. 122 Other courts have disregarded statutory mediation privileges 
when they have conflicted with other legal rules. 123 Still others have 
simply flouted an established privilege when it has proved inconven-
ient.124 Perhaps the only reliable rule in the realm of mediation confi-
dentiality is that seemingly settled rules can prove unreliable. 
Increasing judicial appreciation of the importance of mediation 
confidentiality has tracked the growing use of nonbinding ADR, but 
decisions remain inconsistant. The case law shows courts generally 
permitting discovery at the expense of confidentiality during the 
198os125 and then increasingly barring discovery over the course of the 
1990s.126 Foreshadowing the later trend, the Sixth Circuit held in 1988 
that the press did not have a First Amendment right of access to a 
summary jury trial about the construction of a nuclear reactor; the 
court reasoned that the event was more like a settlement conference 
than a trial and that press access would hamper the goal of promoting 
settlement.l 27 Yet many courts continue to prioritize other concerns 
over confidentiality. For example, the Eighth Circuit recently allowed 
testimony despite mediation confidentiality to enforce a mediated set-
tlement agreement reached three days after a summary judgment mo-
tion had been granted to the defendant, even though neither party was 
aware that the order had been granted.128 
122 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 148 F.3d 487, 489 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that a federal 
statutory requirement that agricultural mediation programs be confidential did not create a privi-
lege protecting mediation records from a grand jury subpoena). 
123 See, e.g., Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 466 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a 
juvenile's constitutional right to confrontation trumps a mediator's statutory right not to be called 
as a witness); Vernon v. Acton, 693 N.E. 2d 1345, 1349-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an 
agreement that a mediation would be confidential did not prevail over the rules of evidence). 
124 See, e.g., Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1131-33 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(holding that a mediator's right not to testify yields when the evidence is material and the dispu-
tants agree to waive the privilege); Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., No. 
B124482, 2000 WL 218353 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2000) (holding that, regarding sanctions, a court 
may consider parts of a mediator's report and communications made during the mediation). 
125 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'! Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., Boo F.2d 
339, 346 (3d Cir. 1986) (permitting discovery of settlement documents despite their having been 
placed under seal); Center for Auto Safety v. Department of Justice, 576 F. Supp. 739, 749 (D.D.C. 
1983) (holding that Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence places a limit only on admissibility, 
not on discovery). But see NLRB v. Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 56 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that the 
public interest in maintaining the perceived and actual impartiality of mediators outweighs the 
benefits derivable from a mediator's testimony). 
126 See, e.g., Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys., 132 F.R.D. 548, 552-55 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (applying the 
federal law of privilege and the underlying policy of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
protect from discovery documents related to settlement negotiations). 
127 See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904-o5 (6th Cir. 1988). 
128 See Sheng v. Starkey Lab., Inc., 117 F.3d zo81, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1997). By holding that even 
mutual mistake is insufficient to rescind a mediated agreement, the court implied that its role in 
facilitating private resolution of disputes is paramount to its role in applying public law. 
!868 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. IIJ:I752 
Poorly developed rules of mediation confidentiality also plague 
matters of conflict of interest and the scope of permissible representa-
tion in subsequent disputes. Because attorneys representing a party in 
a mediation are privy not only to their clients' confidential informa-
tion, but also to "off the record" information of all the other parties, 
their ethical responsibilities in future representation are more complex 
than in the adversarial context envisioned by rules of professional con-
duct.129 Attorneys acting as neutrals - a situation entirely unantici-
pated by the rules - face even more difficult ethical questions. 130 
Courts increasingly err on the side of disqualification, if for no 
other reason than to satisfy public perception.131 However, a recent 
case in the Southern District of New York highlights the potential for 
abuse in the absence of clear confidentiality rules. In Fields-D'Arpino 
v. Restaurant Associates,132 the court disqualified a law firm as counsel 
for a defendant corporation in a discrimination suit to avoid "an ap-
pearance of impropriety" because one of its lawyers had previously at-
tempted to mediate the case.133 Appearances were not all that were at 
stake: not only had the firm failed to implement screening procedures 
to prevent the mediator from sharing confidential information, it had 
also used such confidential information to rebut the plaintiff's charge 
of discrimination during an administrative proceeding.134 
C. Judicial ADR, Fairness, and the Future 
In 1996, a landmark study of federal judicial ADR and settlement 
practices demonstrated the explosion of judicial ADR even before pas-
sage of the ADRA. 135 The study called attention to the questions this 
trend raises for judges, lawyers, and policymakers: 
Do judges have the resources to identify and refer cases to different types 
of ADR? Will a court's ADR or settlement approaches influence a liti-
gant's choice of forum or affect other key litigation decisions? Should 
129 For example, may a lawyer who represents a plaintiff in a mediation subsequently represent 
a different plaintiff against the same defendant without breaching confidentiality? See Barajas v. 
Oren Realty & Dev. Co., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62, 63 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding in the affirmative). 
130 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 22, at 422-44. In response to this problem, the CPR 
Institute for Dispute Resolution and the Georgetown University Law Center have drafted the Pro-
posed Model Rule of Professional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral, which recom- · 
mends guidelines regarding competence, confidentiality, impartiality, conflicts of interest, fees, and 
fairness. See Elizabeth Plapinger & Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ADR Ethics: Model Rules Would 
Clarify Lawyer Conduct When Serving as a Neutral, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1999, at 20, 20. 
131 See, e.g., Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 863-64 (Ct. App. 1995) (disqualifying a 
firm as trial counsel after a former judge who had presided over settlement conferences in the suit 
joined the firm, in order to preserve public confidence in the integrity of the legal process). 
132 39 F. Supp. 2d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
133 /d.at418. 
134 Seeid.at417. 
135 See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, .!upra note 43· 
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lawyers learn negotiation as well as litigation skills? Is the development of 
rules for court ADR programs good or bad for a dispute resolution process 
that has relied in the past on flexibility and, in many instances, informal-
ity? Has ADR eclipsed the role of judges in settlement, or have trial 
courts become primarily settlement forums? Are national rules needed to 
bring uniformity and good standards of practice to the array of innova-
tions now found in the district courts? Should there be ethical rules or 
guidelines for court-connected ADR neutrals?136 
The ADRA's mandate that all federal districts implement ADR pro-
grams demands more focused consideration of these issues. 
Among the most important areas of development needed in judicial 
ADR is the designation of uniform standards of ethics and procedure 
to ensure fundamental fairness. Experience with private ADR demon-
strates that fairness concerns are not unfounded; such problems as co-
ercion have arisen in the contexts of both arbitration137 and media-
tion.138 As ADR becomes more compulsory and less "alternative," it is 
imperative that these problems not contaminate court-annexed ADR, 
lest they erode the public legitimacy on which judiciary depends. 
1. Judicial ADR and Due Process. - Although the Constitution 
canonized societal concern for fairness in the language of due process, 
determining the specific guarantees of due process continues to preoc-
cupy courts and commentators. The Supreme Court has articulated 
the essence of due process, perhaps circularly, as the fundamental fair-
ness that society has come to expect in proceedings with the state. 139 
The relevant controversy over ADR stems from the absence of con-
sensus on which "due process" protections are appropriate in quasi-
judicial proceedings. Most judicial ADR programs allow litigants to 
reject a neutral's recommendation and proceed to trial; therefore, these 
litigants are not denied their right to trial. 140 However, the embryonic 
state of ADR professional norms, local district rules, and statutory law 
regarding procedure translates into deep insecurity for litigants about 
how participation in ADR may affect their enjoyment of that right. 141 
Whether ADR in general calls for the due process required of state be-
136 /d. at v. 
137 See., e.g., Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 276-78 (Ct. App. 1998); see also 
supra p. 1864 (discussing Badie). 
138 See, e.g., Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947-48 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (finding coercion of par-
ties by a mediator); see also Department of Tl'ansp. v. City of Atlanta, 380 S.E.2d 265, 268 (Ga. 
1989) (overturning a trial court for threatening contempt if the parties failed to settle in mediation). 
139 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-70 (1970). 
140 See, e.g., Capitol Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. I, 45-46 (1899). 
141 This insecurity stems from the fact that "forms of ADR designed to provide more efficient 
adjudication, such as arbitration, usually do so by omitting steps traditionally associated with ad-
judicatory procedure, while mediative processes reject basic assumptions of the adversarial model 
of adjudication." Golann, supra note 44, at 531. 
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havior animates debate,142 but it seems clear that court-annexed ADR 
should comply with at least rudimentary notions of due process. 
Evidence suggests that a certain degree of "due process" is already 
present in ADR practice as a result of the saturation of professional 
conflict management culture with fairness norms consistent with due 
process.143 Reviewing the constitutional issues raised by ADR, one 
scholar posits the fundamental concern as "whether ADR constitutes 
an unreasonable barrier to disputants' access to court, or unreasonably 
impairs the quality of later adjudicative hearings"144 and concludes 
that neither is generally true. 145 However, in the most thorough treat-
ment of the issue to date, Richard Reuben argues that the private-
public nexus strand of the state action doctrine146 subjects all court-
related and most contractual ADR to constitutional scrutiny.147 
Considering which procedural standards are thus necessary, Reu-
ben isolates the core aspects of due process required in ADR as the 
right to an impartial tribunal, the right to present and contest evi-
dence, and the right to representation by counsel.148 He then suggests 
that different ADR processes implicate these rights to various degrees: 
arbitration, as an adjudicatory process, requires respect for all three; 
consensual mediation, in which the presentation of evidence does not 
drive the formal process, does not necessitate evidence-related rights; 
and advisory processes like court-annexed early neutral evaluation, 
142 Compare id. at 531-46 (presuming that it does not), with Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: 
Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 579, S8!r<Jo 
(1997) (insisting that it does). 
143 See, e.g., Sabatino, supra note 23, at 1324-37 (arguing that evidentiary norms of materiality, 
relevance, hearsay, and privilege are approximated in the bulk of ADR practice). Major ADR pro-
viders adhere to certain minimum due process constraints prescribed by three due process proto-
cols, including the employment dispute resolution protocol, see supra note 109, the consumer pro-
tocol, see NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, 
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARB-
ITRATION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES (1998), and the recent health care protocol, see Matthews, su-
pra note 31, at 14. The protocols are promising endeavors but fail to assuage present doubts be-
cause they lack enforcement provisions. 
144 Golann, supra note 44, at S40. 
145 See id. at 56~8. 
146 Reuben relies on the nexus strand rather than the original "public function" strand of the 
state action doctrine. See Reuben, supra note 64, at 999· The public function argument has be-
come more difficult to make since the Supreme Court narrowed the doctrine's scope to include 
only areas of "exclusive" state control, see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 34S, 3S2-
S3 (1974), and subsequently held that the resolution of private disputes was never "exclusively" the 
domain of the state, see Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, r6o-62 (1978). These cases may indi-
cate that private ADR cannot be considered state action. Court-annexed ADR is arguably differ-
ent, however, because the resolution of disputes that private individuals bring to court for judicial 
adjudication is, by definition, a traditional public function reserved exclusively to the state. 
147 See generally Reuben, supra note 64. Reuben expressly exempts contractual mediation, see 
id. at 1091, and advisory mechanisms from the scope of his argument, see id. at r roo. 
148 See id. at ross. 
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which are neither adversarial nor reliant on a tribunal, implicate only 
the right to counsel. 149 
Although Reuben makes the ambitious argument that most con-
tractual ADR represents state behavior, judicial ADR as state action is 
comparatively easy to establish. Court-annexed ADR provided in-
house is state action by definition, but even judicial ADR provided 
privately constitutes state action for doctrinal purposes.150 Litigants 
participate in judicial ADR because the state has either commanded or 
encouraged them to do so, and the relationship between judicial ADR 
and the state is clearly symbiotic. Moreover, state entanglement in 
court-annexed ADR is sufficiently pervasive to satisfy the nexus doc-
trine through the joint participation alone, as the state empowers arbi-
trators to issue subpoenas, compel testimony, and grant awards. 151 
This degree of state involvement suggests that the safeguards of 
due process should, as a constitutional matter, apply to judicial ADR. 
Although requiring judicial ADR to follow the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and Civil Procedure in their entirety would defeat the value 
(and purpose) of ADR mechanisms, the basic norms of fairness inher-
ent in these rules must nevertheless inform ADR procedures if they are 
to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Reuben's proposal is noteworthy 
for applying constitutional values to ADR in a rigorous manner that 
nonetheless leaves room for each mechanism to function effectively. 
Some worry that the adaptation of legal norms by ADR endangers 
its essential substance. For example, Professor Menkel-Meadow con-
tends that the flexibility inherent in ADR processes enables disputants 
to craft more satisfying remedies than the adversarial process al-
lows.152 She sounds an alarm on behalf of early ADR enthusiasts that 
the increasing judicialization of ADR represents its co-optation.153 
However, in the context of judicially mandated ADR, the state's in-
volvement argues strongly for - if not compels - prioritizing the pro-
tection of constitutional rights. 
149 See id. at 960. This tripartite distinction is useful, but in reality, the categories blur: early 
neutral evaluation and mediation range from the facilitative versions to evaluative forms that ap-
proach adjudication, see Riskin, supra note 7, at 17, and may require greater protection of rights. 
ISO The public-private nexus (or "entanglement") strand of the doctrine finds state action if the 
government encourages constitutionally problematic private behavior or is sufficiently entangled 
therein. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924-25 (1982) (finding state action 
when a private disputant obtained the cooperation of a court clerk and a sheriff in the execution of 
a prejudgment lien). More recently, the Supreme Court has articulated this strand as a theory of 
joint participation between private actors and the state machinery that enables the problematic 
behavior. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622-24 (1991) (finding state ac-
tion when a private civil litigant used peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on racial grounds). 
lSI See Reuben, supra note 64, at 1005-o6. 
152 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 22, at 416-17. 
153 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 23, at 3· 
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2. Recommendations. - Even if judicial ADR is not state action, 
due process values provide a starting point for considering which fair-
ness standards judicially sponsored programs should incorporate as a 
matter of public policy. Applying procedural constraints to ADR will 
require delicacy to ensure that its values are not lost. As a preliminary 
measure, its mechanisms must be considered separately. For example, 
rules of confidentiality are less troublesome in the adversarial (and ac-
cordingly tight-lipped) context of arbitration than in the facilitative 
context of mediation. In contrast, the requirement of a written ration-
ale is critical when a decision is imposed in arbitration, but probably 
unnecessary in most mediation contexts, in which any agreement is 
consensual by definition. Alternatively, some constraints, such as certi-
fication and conflicts of interest rules, pertain to all ADR processes. 
(a) Confidentiality. - Procedural guidelines for facilitative pro-
grams must focus on establishing confidentiality rules that protect con-
fidences revealed during good faith mediation and still peacefully co-
exist with other legal norms, especially a defendant's right of 
confrontation. Rulemakers must consider a host of thorny issues, in-
cluding whether to attach the privilege to the mediator as well as the 
participant, how the privilege might be waived or qualified by judicial 
discretion, and how to apply it in the criminal context, in which its in-
vocation against the admissibility of evidence carries its greatest costs 
to both individuals and society. 154 Such questions are already being 
considered at the state level by the drafters of the Uniform Mediation 
Act,155 who are closely watching the experiences of individual states 
that have already codified mediation rules.156 
(b) Evidence. - Adjudicative and evaluative mechanisms may 
demand even more ambitious evidentiary guidelines.157 Because these 
mechanisms involve fact-finding based on presentation of evidence, 
the fundamental norms of fairness associated with due process require 
protection through more specifically articulated standards. When the 
judiciary empowers private adjudicators to wield the binding force of 
1S4 If a mediation privilege is recognized, a litigant may suffer admission of ADR evidence with-
out being afforded the right of cross-examination to expose weaknesses in the process that led to 
the disputable result. Alternatively, a defendant might unduly benefit by exercising the privilege 
against incriminating evidence. 
ISS The drafting committees of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws recently met to review the March 1000 draft of the Uniform Mediation Act, which details 
procedures, limitations, rules of privilege and confidentiality, waiver and estoppel, and enforce-
ment provisions. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT§§ 1-13 (Draft Mar. 2000). 
IS6 For example, mediation confidentiality enjoys perhaps its greatest statutory protection under 
a recent California law, see CAL. EVID. CODE.§ 1II9 (West. Supp. 2000) (rendering inadmissible 
and protecting from discovery communications arising out of a mediation), and yet the privilege 
has been undermined in several cases, see supra pp. 1866-67. 
IS7 Participants in compulsory arbitration may be disadvantaged later if the neutral fails to cre-
ate a record of the decision, foreclosing judicial review for manifest disregard of law. 
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a court judgment or a subpoena, it must be sure that they will exercise 
judgment consistent with due process and that sufficient recourse ex-
ists if they fail. Even if due process standards are not required consti-
tutionally, they convey the legitimate and equitable values that ADR 
should manifest as a matter of public policy. The privately promul-
gated due process protocols158 are positive contributions to this end (at 
least to the extent that they actually constrain behavior, which remains 
unclear in the absence of monitoring or enforcement measures). 
(c) Public Accountability. -Judicial ADR must be structured to 
ensure public accountability and to preserve legitimacy in the eyes of 
participants. Especially in disputes involving unequal bargaining 
power, judicial ADR providers may never be regarded as truly neutral 
unless they are state-funded.159 When private neutrals are paid di-
rectly by disputants, they may prove more beholden to the repeat 
players in commercial disputes than to their adversaries.160 Mean-
while, policymakers must address more rigorously the problem of cases 
that are inappropriate for ADR: those characterized by gross power 
imbalances or violence between parties.161 Cases involving domestic 
violence and child abuse exemplify disputes for which negotiation-
based resolution may be not only inappropriate, but also dangerous.162 
(d) Ethical Issues. - Rulemakers must also grapple with basic 
ethical issues raised by judicial ADR, particularly questions regarding 
conflicts of interest in subsequent negotiations. The ethical responsi-
bilities of ADR providers who are not acting as attorneys remain in-
choate.163 Moreover, the bar has yet to address adequately the scope 
of an attorney's duty to inform clients of ADR options,164 and ADR 
advocates have yet to perfect guidelines for practitioners that would 
prevent conflicts of interest in future representation while preserving 
the vitality of the profession.165 Further ethical issues for considera-
158 See supra notes 109, 143· 
159 Cf Brazil, supra note 2, at 762 (suggesting that judicial ADR would be less subject to ille-
gitimacy concerns on these grounds than private ADR). 
160 The problem of neutrality is thus especially pronounced where court-annexed ADR pro-
grams refer disputants to a roster of private providers who also handle contractual ADR. 
161 See discussion supra p. 1854. 
162 See id. 
163 Professor Menkei-Meadow offers an insightful critique of the application of litigation-
oriented ethical rules to ADR procedures founded on different values and relationships, arguing 
that non-adversarial practice requires its own rules. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 22, at 409. 
164 Some states already require such notice. See Carol VanAuken-Haight & Pamela Chapman 
Enslen, Attorney Duty to Inform Clients of ADR?, 72 MICH. B.J. 1038, 1038 (1993). 
165 The uncritical extension of rigorous representational conflict of interest rules to the non-
representational relationships in ADR may starve the field of practitioners because an ADR neu-
tral is exposed to privileged information from all parties involved and because the available pool of 
trained neutrals remains limited. See Menkei-Meadow, supra note 22, at 437· 
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tion include the fair arrangement of fees and the guaranteed imparti-
ality, diligence, and competence of each provider. 166 
(e) Quality Control. - Finally, when disputing parties surrender 
their conflict to ADR, they must be met by a neutral authority of ap-
propriate expertise in a program monitored for quality. For example, 
mediators must receive training not only in negotiation, but also about 
due process norms to protect both the rights of the participants and 
the integrity of the process. Certain realms of dispute resolution may 
also require a neutral's expertise in a substantive field of law or indus-
try. Recognizing that the quality of a program's neutrals is determina-
tive of the program's success (and that the court must meet quality 
standards when it annexes such a program), the Society of Profession-
als in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) has drafted guidelines for "court-
connected" ADR programs to ensure their quality.167 In addition to 
suggesting active monitoring of court-annexed neutrals, SPIDR rec-
ommends that courts establish minimum criteria for competency 
(which would not restrict the practice of ADR to lawyers), that neu-
trals and criteria be subject to periodic review, and that settlement rate 
not be the sole basis on which neutrals are retained. 168 Also of note, 
the Institute of Judicial Administration (IJA) has issued a set of rec-
ommendations for overall quality control of court-annexed mediation 
programs.169 
The current blossoming of private proposals represents the efforts 
of multiple stakeholders to impose order on the creative chaos that has 
nurtured the ADR movement but now threatens its ability to yield fair, 
predictable results. The judiciary must formulate policies regarding 
the qualifications of ADR providers and standards for overseeing their 
performance, and SPIDR and the IJA offer excellent templates. Addi-
tionally, the Center for Public Resources and Georgetown's Proposed 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party 
Neutral offers a helpful starting point for consideration of standards 
addressing other ethical uncertainties faced by lawyers practicing in 
non-representational contexts.170 Together with the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act171 and the forthcoming Uniform Mediation Act,172 federal 
166 David Hoffman makes an eloquent case for certification of ADR providers, proposing how to 
do so without stifling development of the profession or purging non-legal practitioners. See David 
Hoffman, Certifying ADR Providers, BOSTON B.]., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 9, 22-25. 
167 SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, QUALIFYING DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION PRACTITIONERS: GUIDELINES FOR COURT -CONNECTED PROGRAMS (I 997 ). 
168 See id. ati-iii. 
169 See CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, THE INSTITUTE OF jUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 
NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS (1992). 
170 See Plapinger & Menkei-Meadow, supra note 130, at 2r. 
171 In 1955, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws issued the Uni-
form Arbitration Act, which codified general arbitration procedures. See UNIFORM ARBITRATION 
2000] DEVELOPMENTS- THE PATHS OF CIVIL LITIGATION 1875 
courts establishing judicial ADR programs under the ADRA are not 
lacking for guidance. Nor are the members of the Judicial Conference 
or state and federal legislators. Policymakers are fortunate to have ac-
cess to these resources, and the time for drawing upon them is nigh. 
D. Conclusion 
Reaping the best and avoiding the worst will be a matter of care-
fully channeling the entropic forces unleashed by ADR's flexibility. 
ADR's relative freedom from procedural constraints expands options 
for private parties, but its removal of disputes from the public sphere 
undermines the public process of interpreting laws. Choices made now 
about the best ways to focus ADR toward the conflicts it can best re-
solve - and away from the judicial foundations it could most damage 
- represent, perhaps, the most important legal responsibility of the 
new century. 
ACT, §§ r-25, 7 U.L.A. r (Supp. 1999). It has thus far been adopted in 29 states; 14 others have 
adopted similar laws. See GOLDBERG, SA!Io'DER& ROGERS, supra note 5, at 627. 
172 See supra note rss. 
